In the Matter of the Adoption of Diane Deveraux and Gene Deveraux : Appellees\u27 Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
In the Matter of the Adoption of Diane Deveraux
and Gene Deveraux : Appellees' Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
S. E. Blackham; Attorney for Appellees;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Deveraux, No. 8055 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2080
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
- ''0 
\\
' ,..\-~1 
.-·G.. ·. ), ...... . 
.... \\4, .. --· ;;·: \'':_\; 3 
In tke Matter of tke Adoption h. \'~5Y'! \ i.J 
of 
GENE DEVERAUX, 
A Minor. 
In tke Matter of tke Adoption 
APPELLEES' 
BRIEF 
of 
DIANE DEVERAUX, 
A Minor. 
S. E. BLACKHAM, 
Attorney for Appellees 
ARROW PRESS, BA~T LAKE 
J.--
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT 
THE FACTS 
Deprivation of Custody 
Adoption Proceedings 
PERTINENT TESTIMONY 
Re: Appellant 
Re: Condition of Children 
Page 
1 
2 
2 
3 
5 
5 
6 
(1) At time of placement with appellees 6 
(2) After care by appellees 7 
Re: Care of Children 
( 1) Neglect by appellant 
(2) Care by appellees 
Re: Consequences of taking children from 
7 
7 
8 
appellees 9 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 11 
ARGUMENT 13 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 13 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JUR-
ISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER 
OF THESE PROCEEDINGS AND THE 
RIGHT TO PROCEED UNDER THAT JUR-
ISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . 14 
(a) Jurisdiction 15 
(b) Right to Proceed 19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
POINT II. THE CONSENT OF THE NATURAL 
MOTHER WAS NOT NECESSARY TO 
VALID ADOPTIONS BECAUSE SHE HAD 
BEEN JUDICIALLY DEPRIVED OF THE 
CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN BY THE 
JUVENILE COURT ON ACCOUNT OF 
Page 
NEGLECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY 
DECREED THESE ADOPTIONS WITHOUT 
THE CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTH-
ER BY VIRTUE OF HER HAVING BEEN 
JUDICIALLY DEPRIVED OF THEIR CUS-
TODY BY THE JUVENILE COURT . . . . . . . . . . 33 
POINT IV. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS RE-
QUIRED TO CONSIDER AND MAKE FIND-
INGS AS TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILDREN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
POINT V. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND DECREE AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE JUVENILE COURT DATED FEBRU-
ARY 13, 1953, IN THE MATTER OF LARRY 
AND BLAINE DEVERAUX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
POINT VI. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY 
REFUSED TO ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE 
WRITTEN REPORT OF THE TOOELE 
COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT . . 43 
POINT VII. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW .................................. 44 
POINT VIII. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILDREN REQUIRE THEIR ADOPTIONS 
BY THE APPELLEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX 
CASES CITED 
Baker v. Dept. of Registration, 78 U. 424, 3 P. 
Page 
51 
i 
~ (2d) 1082 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
' . 
·~ 
Chatwin v. Terry, 107 U. 340, 153 P. (2d) 941 .. 16, 18, 24 
City of El Dorado v. Citizens' Light & Power Co., 
250 s. w. 882 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Coleman v. Bennett, 69 S. W. 734 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
In reAdoption of D -- -, 252 P. (2d) 223 ...... 38, 40, 46 
Ex parte Day, 65 P. (2d) 1049 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
Heaman v. E. N. Rowell Co., 258 N. Y. S. 138 . . . . 26 
Howes v. Cohen, 255 P. (2d) 761 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
Jackson v. Spellman, 28 P. (2d) 125 .............. 29, 31 
Jensen v. Sevy, 103 U. 220, 134 P. 
(2d) 1081 ...................... 16, 17,18, 19, 28, 39 
Ketch v. Smith, 268 P. 715 ...................... 25, 26 
Kramer v. Pixton, 72 U. 1, 268 P. 1029 . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Machowik v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 94 S. W. 256... 38 
Minterv. Tootle-Campbell Dry Goods Co., 173 S. W. 4.. 26 
In re Olson, 180 P. (2d) 210 ............ 18, 19, 27, 45, 47 
Onsrud v. Lehman, 243 P. (2d) 600 .............. 29,46 
People v. House, 4 U. 369, 10 P. 838 .............. 15, 16 
Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. 541 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
Peters v. Lohr, 124 N. W. 853 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
Ronck v. Ronck, 218 P. (2d) 902 ................ 29, 31 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42 U. 548 18 
In re Schwab's Adoption, 50 Atl. (2d) 504 . . . 40 
Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 266 N. W. 872 . . . . 26 
Smith v. Smith, 180 P. (2d) 853 . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
In re Smith's Estate, 195 P. (2d) 842 
Soule v. Soule, 87 P. 205 ...... . 
State v. Telford, 93 U. 228, 72 P. (2d) 626 
35 
25 
20 
Westerlund v. Croaff, 198 P. (2d) 842 ............ 24, 35 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 129 
F. 849 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Wetherall v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 
263 N. W. 745 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 .... 31, ii 
Section 55-10-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ... 18, 19, 24, ii 
Section 55-10-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ........ iii 
Section 55-10-30 ( 5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 . . 37 
Section 55-10-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 . . . . . iv 
Section 55-10-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 . 37 
Section 55-10-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 . . . . 37 
Section 78-3-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
. . . . . . . . ........... 22, 24, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 44, v 
Section 78-30-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ...... 15, 16, v 
Section 78-30-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ...... 20, 21, v 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Conti'nued 
Section 78-39-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
Section 78-30-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
OTHER CITATIONS 
Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution of Utah 
Article VIII, Section 7, Constitution of Utah 
1 American Jurisprudence 642 
I American Juris prudence 645 
24 A. L. R. 427 . 
Page 
.. 39, v 
vi 
18 
15 
34 
.. 34, 50 
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Adoption 
of 
GENE DEVERAUX, 
A Minor. 
In the Matter of the Adoption 
of 
DIANE DEVERAUX, 
A Minor. 
STATEMENT 
APPELLEES' 
BRIEF 
The proceedings relating to the adoption of Diane 
Deveraux and Gene Deveraux, respectively, have been 
consolidated by order of this Court. 
Except for minor differences as to the nature, condi-
tion and reaction of each of said children, the facts in the 
two cases are the same. 
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THE FACTS 
Deprivation of Custody 
By decree made and entered on August 31, 1950, (Tr. 
246) , the Juvenile Court of the Third Judicial District in 
and for Utah County determined that Ellis Deveraux and 
Rhea Walker Deveraux (now Rhea Walker Brown, the ap-
pellant herein) are unfit and improper persons to have the 
care, custody and control of their children. The body of said 
decree is as follows : 
"IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED and DE-
CREED by the Court that Ellis Deveraux and Rhea 
Walker Deveraux, the parents, of said children be 
and they are hereby deprived of the custody of said 
children. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, by the Court 
that said Larry, Blaine, Gene, and Dianne Deveraux 
Walker Deveraux, the parents, of said children be 
dependent, neglected, children within the meaning of 
the laws of Utah, in such cases made and provided, 
and that subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
Court, the said : children be committed to the Utah 
State Department of Public Welfare for foster home 
care, treatment, and supervision. And it is further 
ordered by the Court that the father, Ellis Deveraux 
pay $100.00 per month for their support and mainte-
nance" (Tr. 54, 246). 
Pursuant to said decree, the children were placed by 
the Utah State Department of Public Welfare in the home 
of Mr. and Mrs. Lindberg (Tr. 134, 197, ~13) and later 
were moved to other foster homes (Tr. 133, 139-140, 198, 
199). 
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On January 17, 1951, Gene was placed in the home of 
Clyde D. Sandgren and Zola M. Sandgren (Tr. 57), and 
Diane was placed in the home of Ray Cole Stickney and 
Dona Merl Stickney on February 6, 1951 (Tr. 139-140). 
Ever since those dates, said children have been and now 
are in the custody of said foster parents (the respective 
appellees) (Tr. 40, 48, 57, 60). 
Adoption Proceedings 
After the children had been in their homes for more 
than one year, appellees petitioned the Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict Court in and for Utah County, in separate proceedings, 
for the adoption of said children, relying upon the provisions 
of Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which elim-
inates the necessity of obtaining the consent "from a father 
or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody 
of the child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion." 
After the decrees of adoption had been entered (Gene, 
Tr. 4-5; Diane, Tr. 6-7), appellant's attorney was permitted . 
an ex parte examination of the sealed files and appellant 
filed in said District Court complaints seeking writs of 
habeas corpus and custody of said children (Tr. 69, 126) 
upon the ground that she had not received notice of the 
adoption proceedings and had not consented to such adop-
tions. 
In view of the fact that appellant had, by said ex parte 
examination of the sealed files, obtained full information as 
to the whereabouts of the children, appellees had no objec-
tion to having the District Court set aside the adoption de-
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crees, and hear the adoption matters on notice to the na-
tural.parents. Therefore, while the habeas corpus proceed-
ings were pending, formal notice was given to the natural 
parents and the hearings were held on February 4, 1953. 
At that time the decrees of adoption theretofore entered 
were vacated (Tr. 31), testimony was offered by appellees 
in support of their petitions (Tr. 39-52, 56-62), the natural 
father of the children consented in writing to the adoption 
of each child (Tr. 35-6, 55-6), and appellant stipulated that 
appellees are fit and proper persons to adopt the respective 
children (Tr. 44, 56). 
Before any testimony was taken, appellant filed written 
motions to dismiss the petitions (Gene, Tr. 6; Diane, Tr. 
8) upon the following grounds: 
( 1) Another action was pending; (2) the Juvenile 
Court had exclusive jurisdiction; (3) appellant never con-
sented to the adoptions; and ( 4) the children were never 
placed in a children's aid society pursuant to Section 55-
10-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the adoptions were 
never authorized by the Juvenile Court pursuant to Section 
55-10-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
After the taking of some testimony, appellant made 
oral motions. In the case of Diane, said motion was based 
upon the grounds that neither the natural mother nor the 
Juvenile Court had consented to the adoption and that there· 
had been no permanent deprivation of custody by the J uv-
enile Court (Tr. 52). In the case of Gene, the motion was 
founded upon the contentions that no consent to the adop-
tion had been given by the natural mother or the Juvenile 
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<: Court, and that the latter court still had jurisdiction in the 
~ matter (Tr. 62). The court denied appellant's motions 
It~ (Tr. 63). 
H~ 
rti~-:3 
byil£;: 
notiun 11 
PERTINENT TESTIMONY 
Upon the hearings on the adoption petitions, unre-
futed testimony was introduced as follows : 
Re: Appellant 
After the natural parents were deprived of 
custody by the Juvenile· Court, they were divorced 
(Tr. 64). Said divorce was obtained January 9, 
1951 (Tr. 65). 
Natural mother (appellant) had sexual relations 
with Henry Brown prior to divorce from natural 
father of G~ne and Diane (Tr. 75). 
Appellant started living with Brown, as his 
wife, in April, 1951 (Tr. 73), which was four months 
after the interlocutory decree of divorce was 
granted. 
Appellant's sole reasons for wanting the child-
ren returned to her were that ( 1) she would like to 
have her family together, (2) the two older boys 
asked about Gene and Diane, and ( 3) she could 
now take care of them (Tr. 87). 
Henry Brown is not acquainted with the sub-
ject children and they don't know him (Tr. 93, 
97-8) . His interest in them was a mild interest 
(Tr. 202). At the time he made a payment to the 
Welfare Department for the care of appellant's four 
children, he indicated that his reason for doing so 
was that "he might as well be paying his money to 
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the Welfare Department, because if he didn't he'd 
have to pay it to the Government in income taxes" 
(Tr. 202). 
Prior to commencement of the adoption pro-
ceedings, appellant made only inquiries about the 
children, but took no steps to regain their custody 
(Tr. 100). 
n(~: Condition of Children 
(1) At time of placement with appellees: 
At the time the children were placed with ap-
pellees, they were both suffering from malnutrition, 
were pale, bore forlorn and almost hostile express-
ions (Tr. 132), and were in need of much love and 
care (Tr. 198). 
Diane was very small (Tr. 132, 140, 166, 168, 
194), undernourished (Tr. 40), in poor health (Tr. 
195), anemic (Tr. 214), had rickets (Tr. 40), craved 
affection (Tr. 216), lacked security (Tr. 194), had 
dull hair and eyes (Tr. 140, 194), was knock-kneed 
or pigeon toed (Tr. 40, 148, 164, 194), appeared to 
be unhappy (Tr. 140, 162, 194), was exceptionally 
timid or frightened (Tr. 40, 132, 141, 148, 164, 166, 
168), was afraid of other children (Tr. 195), and 
had no religious training (Tr. 76). 
Gene was very thin (Tr. 152, 188, 190), pale 
(Tr. 180), undernourished (Tr. 180), neurotic (Tr. 
211), wet the bed regularly (Tr. 222-3), seemed to 
be lost and unwanted (Tr. 190), appeared to be 
timid or frightened (Tr. 132, 152, 155, 171, 178), 
lacked security (Tr. 178, 216), craved affection (Tr. 
216), was resentful, suspicious and on the defensive 
(Tr. 146, 171, 172), was disobedient (Tr. 223), 
difficult to manage (Tr. 152, 172, 181, 187, 190, 
199, 216), indulged in temper tantrums (Tr. 140), 
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was frustrated (Tr. 177), anti-social (Tr. 177, 199), 
refused to participate with others (Tr. 152), re-
sented adult authority (Tr. 177), used bad language 
(Tr. 223), was cruel to small children (Tr. 207), 
and had no religious training (Tr. 76). 
(2) After care by appellees: 
Since receiving the love and care of appellees, 
the general physical condition of both children has 
improved (Tr. 135, 216-17), and they appear to be 
happier and more secure (Tr. 135). 
Diane is now happy (Tr. 136, 148), her legs are 
becoming straight (Tr. 41, 149, 164), her color is 
much better (Tr. 217), she has filled out (Tr. 164, 
166), her hair is nice (Tr. 41, 165), she acts like a 
normal child (Tr. 165), she is no longer afraid of 
people (Tr. 141, 162, 166, 168, 195), is more secure 
(Tr. 217), her general health and attitudes are very 
good (Tr. 195-6), and she has received religious 
training (Tr. 42, 43, 141, 148, 162). 
Gene is now happier (Tr. 143, 186), maturing 
normally (Tr. 178), has shown a marked improve-
ment in physical condition (Tr. 181, 184, 188), is 
well-nourished and doesn't catch cold as readily (Tr. 
184), has become friendly and has greater trust in 
people (Tr. 136, 172), exhibits good deportment (Tr. 
216-17), is cooperative (Tr. 178, 181), has become 
well-mannered (Tr. 143, 153, 155, 188), enjoys im-
proved social relationships (Tr.172, 178,181, 190), 
he no longer wets the bed ( Tr. 223) , or is mean to 
other children ( Tr. 143, 178) , and he has/ received 
religious training (Tr. 152, 155, 171). 
Re: Care of Children 
(1) Neglect by Appellant: 
Appellant's neglect of and lack of interest in the child-
rent is shown not only by the Juvenile Court's decree de-
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priving her of custody but also by the confidential reports 
of the State Department of Public Welfare filed in the re-
spective adoption proceedings and referred to at page 242 
of the Transcript. Those reports show the following: 
"* • • the following behavior may indicate a lack 
of genuine interest in the children: 
" 'Rhea Walker Deveraux was referred to the 
Juvenile Court on February 14, 1945, for contribut-
ing to the neglect of her children, at which time she 
served forty days in the Utah County Jail. She was 
again referred on July 2, 1945, for contributing to 
the neglect of her children and was ordered by the 
Court to serve eighty days in the Utah County Jail. 
When the father, who had been in the service, re-
turned the children were allowed to go back into 
the home.' 
"On August 29, 1950, a petition was filed al-
leging: '* * * that the mother conducts herself 
in a very unladylike manner; that the parents still 
persist in neglecting their children, to-wit: that they 
frequent beer parlors and are continuously intoxi-
cated in the presence of said children. That said 
mother keeps company with men not her husband, 
and leaves her children alone and unattended for 
long periods of time, to-wit: that on or about the 
2nd day of August, 1950 said mother left her child-
ren and did not return until about the 9th day of 
August'." 
(2) Care by Appellees: 
On the other hand, the Transcript is replete with testi-
mony concerning appellees' love and care of the children. 
Special attention is directed to the manner in which the 
/ 
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children have been welcomed into and become a part of the 
homes and families of appellees, as evidenced by the fol-
lowing testimony : 
Diane is a close companion to the adoptive par-
ents-appellees and their world "revolves around her" 
(Tr. 41); they love and provide good care and at-
tention for her (Tr. 49, 141, 149)-just as much as 
though she were their natural child (Tr. 166, 168); 
their respective families have accepted Diane as 
fully as the others in said families (Tr. 196) ; and 
she is living a full and normal life with them (Tr. 
149). 
There is a very close family companionship and 
love between Gene, on the one hand, and the adop-
tive parents-appellees and their other children, on 
the other (Tr. 143-4, 189, 191) -particularly be-
tween Gene and his adoptive father (Tr. 144) ; the 
entire family has accepted him in a normal parent-
child and brother-sister relationship and this is re-
ciprocated on his part (Tr. 61, 153, 178, 181, 182, 
188, 191) ; Gene is treated in the same manner as 
the other children in the family ( Tr. l53, 182, 189 ; 
the adoptive parents-appellees act like they "love" 
and "worship" Gene (Tr. 153) so that he now "feels 
like he belongs" (Tr. 191) ·; and they have given him 
"very constructive training" (Tr. 183). 
Re: Consequences of Taking Children from Appellees 
Several witnesses testified as to the probable result 
to the children if they were now to be taken away from 
appellees: 
Dr. Walter T. ~asler (who was identified in 
appellant's brief as a specialist (Br. 7) but who also 
engages in general practicie (Tr. 180)) expressed 
fear that Gene, who had now "grown into a happy 
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youngster," would be "under great disappointment" 
if he were taken from his adoptive parents (Tr. 
185) and that it would "break down his morale" and 
be "disastrous" ( Tr. 185) and "break down his am-
bitions and desires for the future" (Tr. 184). 
Mrs. Eloise Morley, a social worker in the 
State Department of Public Welfare, is of the opin-
ion that both children would develop fears, insecur-
ities and inability to know where they belong, which 
would produce conflicts, hostilities and unwhole-
some behavior, and as a result they would be un-
happy children (Tr. 201). She was also appre-
hensive that appellant's "home is filled with con-
flicts and uncertainties. It couldn't be predicted at 
all that it would be a stable, well adjusted home 
situation" (Tr. 207). 
Mrs. Elsa V. Harris, Child Welfare Super-
visor for the Department of Public Welfare for Utah 
County, testified that it is "a delicate operation" to 
move a child, that each such move "is a traumatic or 
wounding experience * * * In other words 
every time you move a child there is regression. You 
have to start all over again. It's a pretty painful 
process for both the child and the foster parents 
you place the child with, because they have to take 
all the child comes to the home with, his hostility, 
his need for affection. * * * And if you move 
a child from that situation into another one you are 
taking it as if you would from its own parents, and 
it is an operation that can be quite drastic" (Tr. 
219-20). 
Mark K. Allen, a teacher of and consultant in 
psychology having BA and MA degrees, having com-
pleted the residence requirements for a PhD. and 
having broad experience in that field, testified that 
it is "always traumatic to remove the child and re-
quire him to make adjustments to new situations, 
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where there is a question about whether the child 
would have an equal amount of emotional security 
* * * If it interprets it as a place of security-
where it gets affection, where it feels wanted, and 
feels loved and accepted- certainly you would want 
to be very careful about uprooting that and shifting 
to a situation where that security might not be 
thoroughly guaranteed, judging by the previous his-
tory" (Tr. 229-30), and that "I think the fundament-
al psychological consideration on this kind of a prob-
lem is the matching up of emotional needs of child-
ren with parents, and if a child needs the affection 
that parents need to give to a child I think that is a 
very wholesome situation. In setting the one situa-
tion over against the other that would be the main 
consideration, in my judgment, to demonstrate clear-
ly the genuine emotional needs of parents to have 
the child and of the child to have those parents. In 
my experience with people who choose to adopt child-
ren they usually have a genuine emotional need to 
have those children. Otherwise they wouldn't re-
quest them. That can't always be guaranteed with 
the natural parents. I believe, from the facts stated, 
that it looks quite clear that the emotional need of 
these parents for the child and the child for the par-
ents is real in the present situation, and that this 
child probably has perceived these foster parents 
as fulfilling his needs in a way that has been con-
structive in his development, and that it probably 
would be a psychological risk to destroy that rela-
tionship at his age" (Tr. 231-32). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
§i; THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
iaJf OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE 
wat 
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PROCEEDINGS AND THE RIGHT TO PRO· 
CEED UNDER THAT JURISDICTION. 
POINT II. 
THE CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER 
WAS NOT NECESSARY TO VALID ADOP-
TIONS BECAUSE SHE HAD BEEN JUDICI-
ALLY DEPRIVED OF THE CUSTODY OF THE 
CHILDREN BY THE JUVENILE COURT ON 
ACCOUNT OF NEGLECT. 
POINT III. 
·THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DE-
CREED THESE ADOPTIONS WITHOUT. THE 
CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER BY 
VIRTUE OF HER HAVING BEEN JUDICIAL-
LY DEPRIVED OF THEIR CUSTODY BY THE 
JUVENILE COURT. 
POINT IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS REQUIRED TO 
CONSIDER AND MAKE FINDINGS AS TO 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE FINDINGS OF 
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FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE 
AND JUDGMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT 
DATED FEBRUARY 13, 1953, IN THE MAT-
TER OF LARRY AND BLAINE DEVERAUX. 
POINT VI. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REFUS-
ED TO ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE WRITTEN 
REPORT OF THE TOOELE COUNTY WEL-
FARE DEPARTMENT. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
POINT VIII. 
THE BEST, INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN 
REQUIRE THEIR ADOPTIONS BY THE AP-
PELLEES. 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In answering appellant's brief we point out initially 
that in her statement of facts she has not set forth the full 
judgment of the Juvenile Court but appears to have stu-
·::r diously avoided in that statement, as well as in the re-
, .. 
: OF mainder of her brief, any reference to the most significant 
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part (the real kernel) of that judgment insofar as this ap-
peal is concerned. That provision is as follows : 
"IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED by the Court that Ellis Deveraux and Rhea 
Walker Deveraux, the parents of said children be 
and they are hereby deprived of the custody of said 
children." 
We also desire to correct the misstatements in her brief 
"that throughout the period of time from when the children 
were taken from their natural parents appellant, pursuant 
to the Juvenile Court decree, made payments for their sup-
port" (p. 3), and that "In fact she paid for their support 
pursuant to the Juvenile Court decree" (p. 28). Reference 
to the decree of the Juvenile Court (Ex. A, Tr. 54, 246) will 
show that ( 1) there was no obligation imposed upon the 
appellant to make any payments for the support of the 
children, but the obligation was imposed upon the father, 
and (2) while the decree of the Juvenile Court was rend-
ered August 31, 1950, no payment was made by the appel-
lant until January, 1951, and thereafter only three pay-
ments of $100.00, $60.00 and $60.00, respectively, were 
made. 
For the convenience of the Court we set forth in the 
Appendix (infra pp. ii-vii) the applicable statutes. 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE 
PROCEEDINGS AND THE RIGHT TO PRO-
CEED UNDER THAT JURISDICTION. 
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(a) Jurisdiction 
Article VIII, Section 7, of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah provides that "The District Court shall have origin-
al jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted 
in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law; * * *" 
This provision is carried verbatim into the Judicial Code 
of this state under the provisions of Section 78-3-4, U. C. 
A. 1953. 
District Courts of this state, therefore, are constitu-
tional courts having general jurisdiction in all matters civil 
and criminal not excepted by the Constitution or prohibited 
by the laws of the State. Kramer v. Pixton, 72 U. 1, 268 
P. 1029; Baker v. Department of Registration, 78 U. 424, 
3 P. (2d) 1082. 
This Court early decided that this jurisdiction "covers 
about everything of a civil or criminal nature not expressly 
committed to another tribunal." People v. House, 4 U. 369, 
380, 10 P. 838. And in determining jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court, the test is not whether the court has jurisdiction 
of a particular case, but rather whether the court has juris-
diction of the class of cases to which the particular case 
belongs. Kramer v. Pixton, supra. 
Under the above provisions and decisions it is clear that 
original jurisdiction in adoption matters has been commit-
ted to the District Courts of this state and that no such juris-
diction (concurrent or otherwise) has been expressly or by 
implication committed to any other court. 
:;::: Section 78-30-7 U. C. A. sets forth the specific jurisdic-
?f tion of the District Court in adoption proceedings and the 
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method by which such jurisdiction may be properly invoked 
in any case. It provides that "Adoption proceedings shall 
'be commenced by filing in duplicate a petition with the clerk 
of the district court of the county where the person adopt-
ing resides • • *" 
The record shows that the provisions of Section 78-
80-7 were literally and fully complied with in each of the 
subject cases and thus the court below obtained jurisdiction 
in these proceedings, unless, as pointed out in People v. 
House, supra, jurisdiction is "expressly committed to an-
other tribunal." 
Appellant does not point out wherein jurisdiction in 
adoption matters has been under any circumstances ex-
pressly committed to another tribunal but appears to con-
tend that the District Court did not have jurisdiction be-
cause the Juvenile Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the 
care, custody and control of the minor children. This con-
tention appears to be premised largely upon the decisions of 
this Court in Jensen v. Sevy, 103 U. 220, 134 P. (2d) 1081, 
and Chatwin v. Terry, 107 U. 340, 153 P. (2d) 941, which 
we shall endeavor to demonstrate do not support it. 
In the first place, after reading and rereading many 
times the decision in Jensen v. Sevy, we find no place where-
in it is said, as in appellant's brief, that the Juvenile Court 
had "exclusive jurisdiction of the care, custody and control 
of minor children" and for that reason the District Court 
had no jurisdiction in that case. 
It will be observed that in the Sevy case under the main 
decision of Justice Larson, it was not held that the District 
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~~~ Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the habeas corpus 
~' action brought in that court by the father but it was held 
titil.:.ne~ that the lower court "was charged with the duty of de-
;t.~- termining not merely the custody of a juvenile, based upon . 
questions of its welfare but also the question of the legal-
ity of its restraint or detention" and that "This latter duty 
·lf ~1:'11 it could not refer or certify to the Juvenile Court." In bt~:· 
-~ 
,Jilt]!$ 
-~ 
passing on this last question,. this court said, p. 1087: 
"The District Court concluded that since peti-
tioner admitted he had not made a showing to the 
Juvenile Court as provided in its order, he was not 
entitled to custody under the order of the Juvenile 
Court; and since the order itself was valid, he was 
not entitled to custody in derogation of it. It held 
therefore that the detention of the child by its grand-
parents was lawful and under valid legal process." 
If, therefore, as argued by appellant, the decision in 
Jensen v. Sevy was to the effect that the District Court had 
no jurisdiction and was without power to issue a writ of 
JJ: ::t !S: habeas corpus, since jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court was 
: :t:l· 
exclusive, how then could the District Court hold that the 
~. ll ~i: detention of the child by the grandparents was lawful? 
~ ~: The answer, of ·course, is obvious. The District Court did 
~' have jurisdiction, as this Court held. Similarly, the Dis-
r:w~i! trict Court had jurisdiction to decree the adoptions in the 
Jr:,i; · instant cases. 
cp;:i: Considering the Jensen v. Sevy case further, suppose 
:~~-:::. that the father had made his showing before the Juvenile 
Court and that Court had awarded him the children but 
der~e~ the grandparents had retained custody and had refused to 
the J)istr' 
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let the father have the child. Could it then also be contended 
that the District Court would have no jurisdiction in a 
habeas corpus proceeding? The answer is implicit in the 
above quotation for if in the one case the father was not 
entitled to custody of the child in derogation of the order 
of the Juvenile Court, in the other case he would, by the 
same reasoning, be entitled to custody in conformity with 
an order of the Juvenile Court awarding him custody. 
As mentioned above, this court did not hold in the Sevy 
case that the Juvenile Court had exclusive jurisdiction of 
the care, custody and control of minor children but in the 
concurring opinions of Justice Wolfe and Judge Hoyt it 
was pointed out that the Juvenile Court has in the words 
of the statute itself (Sec. 55-10-5) "exclusive original jur-
isdiction in all cases relating to the neglect, dependency and 
delinquency of children * * *" (Emphasis supplied). 
' The Juvenile Courts of this state are statutory courts, 
established pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1, of the Con-
stitution of the state and were created in 1905 for a special 
purpose with special and limited jurisdiction. Salt Lake 
County v. Salt Lake City, 42 U. 548. This jurisdiction is 
derived from Section 55-10-5 U. C. A. 1953 and its antece-
dents and is limited to cases relating to the neglect, de-
pendency and delinquency of children. In re Olson, 180 P. 
(2d) 210; Jensen v. Sevy, supra, Chatwin v. Terry, supra. 
When jurisdiction shall have been acquired by the court 
in the case (neglect, dependency or delinquency) of any 
child, such child shall continue for the purposes of such 
case (neglect, dependency or delinquency) under the 
jurisdiction of the court until the child becomes 21 years 
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: ~:~ of age, etc.- The Juvenile Court may also have jurisdiction 
:~,l· in a case relating to the custody of neglected, dependent 
and delinquent children. But these adoption cases were not, 
::~~ at the time, cases relating to the negh.:ct, dependency and 
·-, 
-' delinquency of the two children involved and the custody 
,. 
-- of the children was not in question or dispute except as it 
'~ .._ ..... 
--- may have been incidental to the determination of the adop-
: ::::: tions, Cf. In re Olson, supra, nor could it have been under 
. .:::: the Sevey case, because each one of the Appellees had 
custody over the respective children under and by virtue of 
"':..."' ·- the express provisions of the decree of the Juvenile Court 
·- ·-~ 
::.;::- and not in derogation thereof. Cf. Jensen v. Sevy, supra. 
If the above were insufficient to establish the j urisdic-
~;"'\ tion of the District Court in these cases, Section 55-10-5 
U. C. A. and its predecessors establish that jurisdiction 
=~~: 
by retaining in subsection (4) thereof jurisdiction in "other 
courts of the right to determine the custody of children 
upon writs of habeas corpus, or when such custody is inci-
dental to the determination of causes in such courts" (Em-
. ,,- phasis supplied). 
:::-.:::.~· The custody of a child is incidental to the determination 
_ - of adoption. Consequently, the lower court, under the ex-
:::~ press terms of the statute referred to, unquestionably had 
- ·-. complete jurisdiction over the subject matter of these pro-
·.,..,_~ ceedings. 
(b) Right to Proceed 
Jurisdiction of the District Court having been properly 
r£ c. invoked as above shown, the next question (and we believe 
111
der the only real question involved in these appeals) is whether 
21 f; 
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that court had the right to proceed to decree the adoptions. 
Cf. State v. Telford, 93 U. 228, 72 P. (2d) 626. 
Section 78-90-8 U. C. A., 1953, infra, provides as to 
procedure in adoption cases, as follows: 
1. The persons adopting the children and the 
children adopted and the other persons whose con. 
sent is necessary must appear before the court, and 
2. The necessary consent must thereupon be 
signed (by the person whose consent is necessary), 
and · 
3. An agreement be executed by the persons 
adopting to the effect that the children shall be 
adopted and treated in all respects as their own law-
ful children. 
Have these procedural requirements been met? 
The record shows that each of the petitioners adopting 
the children appeared before the court and signed in open 
court the agreements required by Section 78-30-8 U. C. A. 
(Tr. 47, 51-52, 58, 62). The record also shows that the 
children adopted were before the court (Tr. 63). The father 
of the children was before the court and, although not re-
quired to do so, executed his consent to the adoption of both 
children (Tr. 35-36, 55-56). The mother of the children, 
the protestant and appellant herein, was also before the 
court (Diane, Tr. 11-16, Gene, Tr. 9-14) but never signed 
or gave any consent for the adoption of the children. 
Thus it will readily appear that all of the named pro-
cedural requirements of Section 78-30-8 U. C. A. were com· 
plied with except possibly the obtaining of the written con· 
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sent of the mother but, as we shall hereinafter show, that 
consent was not required for the reason that Section 78-
90-8 requires the consent of only those persons "whose con-
sent is necessary" (Emphasis supplied). 
POINT II. 
THE CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER 
WAS NOT NECESSARY TO VALID ADOP-
TIONS BECAUSE SHE HAD BEEN JUDICI-
ALLY DEPRIVED OF THE CUSTODY OF THE 
CHILDREN BY THE JUVENILE COURT ON 
ACCOUNT OF NEGLECT. 
We have shown above that the District Court had 
jurisdiction of these adoption proceedings and that each 
of the procedural requirements has been met. However, 
no consent of the natural mother has been signed or given 
to the adoptions. This leaves only the question whether 
the District Court, under the evidence presented and in 
the absence of consent upon the part of the natural mother, 
can decree the adoptions. This question, while sometimes 
loosely referred to as such, we submit, is not a question of 
jurisdiction but one of proof and a consideration of whether, 
under the evidence, the lower court could decree the adop-
tions. 
On the 31st day of August, 1950, the Juvenile Court 
made and entered its decree and judgment wherein it was 
adjudged that the natural parents, Ellis Deveraux and Rhea 
Walker Deveraux (Rhea Walker Brown, Appellant), are 
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unfit and improper persons to have the care, custody, con-
trol and guardianship of the said Gene and Diane Deveraux, 
as well as two other children not herein involved, and 
decree was entered as follows : 
"IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED and DE-
CREED by the Court that Ellis Deveraux and Rhea 
Walker Deveraux, the parents, of said children be 
and they are hereby deprived of the custody of 
said children. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, by the Court 
that said Larry, Blaine, Gene and Dianne Deveraux 
be and they are hereby declared and adjudged to be 
dependent, neglected, children within the meaning. 
of the laws of Utah, in such cases made and pro-
vided, and that subject to the continuing jurisdiction 
of the Court, the said : children be committed to the 
Utah State Department of Public Welfare for foster 
home care, treatment, and supervision. And it is 
further ordered by the Court that the father, Ellis 
Deveraux pay $100.00 per month for their support 
and maintenance" (Tr. 54, 246). 
It is the appellees' contention that the above judgment 
of the Juvenile Court "judicially deprived" the natural par-
ents of the custody of the children involved "on account of 
* * * neglect * * *" within the clear language and 
comprehension of Section 78-30-4 U. C. A., infra, the applic-
able part of which reads as follows: "except that consent 
r 
i 
is not necessary from a father or mother who has been 
judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account ' 
of cruelty, neglect or desertion;" and that consequently 
the consent of the appellant was not necessary to the adop-
tions herein. 
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Appellant contends, however, that there can be but 
one meaning to the words "judicially deprived of the 
custody of the child on account of cruelty, neglect or de-
sertion" and that is "that the parent has been perman-
ently and absolutely deprived of the custody of the child" 
and she further contends that "the decree of the Juvenile 
Court clearly indicates that this is not the case as it provides 
for continuing jurisdiction and that the father of the child-
ren shall furnish support therefor" (emphasis supplied). 
She contends also that the statutes covering juvenile courts 
indicate that proceedings of the nature of the one presented 
here do not contemplate the permanent or absolute divest-
ing of the custody of a minor child from its parents and 
seems to infer therefrom that one cannot adopt a child 
who has been theretofore brought before the Juvenile Court, 
in any case without the consent of its parents. Appellant 
argues, however, that "unless the natural mother has been 
permanently deprived of the custody of her children her 
written consent was required before a valid adoption could 
be made" (Br. 21), and "The District Court would not 
have jurisdiction of an adoption proceeding unless the 
consent of the parents is given, or is not necessary" (Br. 
23). 
Perhaps our perception is not sufficiently broad to con-
ceive of every way in which a parent may be "judicially 
deprived of the custody of a child," but we know of only 
two ways under the statutes and laws of Utah by which 
this can be done and they are ( 1) by the Juvenile Court 
in the manner in which it was done in the instant cases, and 
(2) by the District Court in divorce proceedings. 
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If the argument of appellant, that the statutes do not 
contemplate the permanent or absolute divesting of the 
custody of minor children because of Section 55-10-5 (3) 
U. C. A., which continues jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court 
over the child, is followed to its logical conclusion, then that 
portion of Section 78-30-1,. U. C. A. reading "except that 
consent is not necessary from a father or mother who has 
been judicially deprived of the custody of the child on 
account of cruelty, neglect or desertion" is a mere nullity 
and cannot be applied in any situation and the legislature 
has done a futile act. 
Of course, this cannot be the case for, in the first 
place, as this Court in Chatwin v. Terry, supra, in stating 
the well-known rule of statutory construction and in con-
struing the provisions of Section 14-7-4 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, which is now Section 55-10-5 of Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, said (p. 942) : 
"In construing statutes such as here it is the 
duty of this court to give meaning to each and to 
reconcile them in such a manner so as to carry out 
the reasonable and practical intention of the Legi~ 
lature." 
See also Westerlund v. Croaff, (Ariz.), 198 P. (2d) 
842, 844, also cited by appellant. 
In the second place, appellant is in error in her premise 
that she was not permanently deprived of the custody of 
the children by the Juvenile Court decree. 
It will be noted here that . appellant has interpolated 
into the statute the words "permanently" and "absolutely," 
neither of which appears therein. 
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We think it a fair assumption, however, that the legis-
lature, in creating the provision of the statute involved, 
intended that it should apply only in the case where there 
has been a permanent deprivation of custody as distinguish-
ed from a temporary deprivation and to that extent we go 
along with appellant's argument. However, we maintain, 
and hope to establish without question herein, that the de-
cree of the Juvenile Court did permanently deprive the 
appellant of the custody of the children and was a depri-
vation to which the above-quoted portion of the statute 
was intended by the legislature to apply and to which it 
does, in fact, apply. 
The word "permanent" has a well-known obvious mean-
ing, and is in contradistinction to the word "temporary," 
and is so used in legal enactments as well as contracts, such 
as insurance policies. Wetherall v. Equitable Life Assur. 
Soc. of U. S., 263 N. W. 745. It is not equivalent to "per-
petual" or "unending" or "lifelong" or "unchangeable." 
Soule v. Soule, 87 P. 205. It does not include the idea of 
"absolute." Coleman v. Bennett, 69 S. W. 734. However, 
the word "absolute" has been defined to mean unconditional, 
complete and perfect in itself without relation to or depend-
ence upon other things or persons. Ketch v. Smith, 268 
P. 715, 717. The wqrd "permanent" does not mean forever, 
or existing forever. West'ern Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania 
Co., 129 F. 849, 867. Ordinances which endure until re-
pealed are deemed to be permanent. City of ElDorado v. 
Citizens' Light & Power Co., 250 S. W. 882. 
"Permanently," as used in the call of the rector of a 
church, that he be and is elected permanently to the rector-
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ship of such church, means an indefinite period. The term 
"permanently" as used does not mean that the parties were 
to be bound together by ties to be dissolved only by mutual 
consent, or for sufficient legal or ecclesiastical reasons. It 
was intended that he should continue to hold the place only 
until one or the other of the contracting parties should de-
sire to terminate the connection. Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. 
641, 648. 
Where plaintiff was employed at a certain rate per 
year, with the statement by the employer that he wanted 
plaintiff to come with the intention of staying permanently, 
the word "permanently" would be regarded as meaning 
nothing more than that plaintiff was to hold his position 
until one or the other of the contracting parties should de-
sire to terminate the connection. Minter v. Tootle-Campbell 
Dry Goods Co., 173 S. W. 4, 6. 
A person is "permanently" employed when he is hired 
for an indefinite period terminable at will. Beaman v. E. 
N. Rowell Co., 258 N. Y. S. 138, 140; Skagerberg v. Blandin 
Paper Co., 266 N. W. 872, 873. 
Measured by the above definitions it is clear that the 
judgment of the Juvenile Court permanently deprived the 
appellant of the custody of the children. The judgment of 
deprivation was "unconditional, complete and perfect in 
itself without relation to or dependence on other things or 
persons," Ketch v. Smith, supra. It would continue indefin-
itely until someone made a move under the appropriate 
statutes to terminate it or modify it in some particular and 
it was not temporary or limited in time. 
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Let us examine the decree of the Juvenile Court. That 
decree declared and adjudged the children to be dependent, 
neglected children within the meaning of the laws of Utah, 
declared that the natural parents (of whom the appellant 
was the mother) were unfit and improper persons to have 
the care, custody, control and guardianship of them and 
then decreed that they (the parents) "be and they are 
hereby deprived of the custody of said children." Nothing 
further was provided in the decree concerning the custody 
of these children insofar as either parent was concerned. 
Their rights to custody were effectively and permanently 
severed by the provisions quoted. Nowhere in the further 
provisions of the decree are any rights whatever continued 
or reserved in the parents or either of them. Whatever jur-
isdiction was retained by the court was not with respect to 
the deprivation of custody from the parents but with re-
spect to the commitment to the Utah State Department of 
Public Welfare "for foster home care, treatment, and sup-
ervision." This retention was only to insure the placement 
of the children in a home -or homes where they would be 
properly treated and cared for. And here again, we repeat 
that the appellees, at the time of filing the adoption peti-
tions, had the custody of the children by virtue of that de-
cree. It is true that liability for certain payments for the 
support and maintenance of the children was imposed upon 
the father, but that liability neither conferred nor continued 
any rights in him and is not a factor in determining whether 
there was a permanent deprivation of custody, as there 
may be a permanent deprivation of custody and yet a con-
tinuing obligation to support the child. Cf. In re Olson, 
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supra. However, this liability was not imposed upon ap-
pellant and even though she may have made three pay-
ments toward the children's support, these payments were 
purely voluntary and not by virtue of any obligation im-
posed upon her by the decree, by statute, or otherwise and 
neither created nor continued any rights to the children in 
her. 
This being the clear import, it would seem to be mani-
fest without further argument that the decree permanently 
deprived both parents of the custody of the children. We 
shall, however, _ proceed further to show that this is the 
inescapable result. 
A comparison of the decree in these cases with that of 
the Juvenile Court in Jensen v. Sevy, supra, clearly shows· 
the difference between a decree permanently depriving a 
parent of custody and one that is interlocutory and in effect 
continues some interest in the parent to the child. The order 
in that case vacated all previous orders and provided: "That 
the Court retains jurisdiction of this matter * * * and 
in the event said petitioner, Fern Jensen, deports himself 
becomingly between the date hereof and June 1, 1942, then 
and in that event said petitioner, Fern Jensen, shall have 
and enjoy the sole custody of said minor child." Under this 
order the court, unlike the court in the instant cases, re-
tained jurisdiction "of this matter," and placed certain 
rights in the father "in the event" he deported himself 
becomingly. In the instant case the Juvenile Court did not 
retain jurisdiction "of this matter," made no reference to 
future custody but committed the children to the Welfare 
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Department for foster home care, "subject to the continuing 
jurisdiction of the Court." 
In further confirmation of our premise that the decree 
permanently deprived the natural parents of the custody 
of the children let us next examine several of the cases 
cited and quoted from at length in appellant's brief. These 
cases are cited in subdivision I, subsection C of th~ brief 
(Br. 21-29) in support of the contention that written con-
sent for adoption is required from the natural mother, but 
we submit that if they stand for anything pertinent to the 
instant cases, they indisputably confirm that which we 
have above maintained-that consent of the natural mother 
in these cases is not necessary to the adoptions because the 
decree of the Juvenile Court permanently deprived the 
natural parents of the custody of the children, continuing 
no rights whatever to the children in either of them. 
The cases of Jackson v. Spellman, (Nev.) 28 P. (2d) 
125, Smith v. Smith, (Idaho) 180 P. (2d) 853, Onsrud v. 
Lehman, (N. Mex.) 243 P. (2d) 600, and Ronck v. Ronck, 
(Okla.) 218 P. (2d) 902, all deal with cases of divorce 
where the custody of a child is awarded to the party secur-
ing the divorce on account of cruelty, desertion, neglect, 
etc., with the right of visitation with the child reserved in 
or granted to the offending spouse. The decisions hold that 
in such cases the consent of the latter is a necessary prere-
quisite to entering of a decree of adoption. The rationale 
of these cases is as stated in Jackson v. Spellman, supra, 
"that where a divorce is granted for cruelty [or desertion 
or neglect] and the innocent spouse is awarded the custody 
of the children, consent of the guilty spouse can only be 
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dispensed with in a proceeding for adoption of such children 
when the custody is awarded to the innocent party without 
reserving any rights whatever in the guilty spouse. The 
custody must be absolute" (emphasis supplied). 
In other words, if a divorce decree is granted on the 
grounds of cruelty, desertion or neglect to a spouse who is 
granted the custody of the children, without the right of 
visitation or other similar right reserved to or granted the 
offending spouse, the consent of the latter is not a necessary 
prerequisite to the entering of a decree of adoption. 
If we examine the decree of the Juvenile Court in the 
cases at Bar and measure it by the principle set forth in the 
cases immediately above considered, it becomes readily ap-
parent that that decree, likewise, is one upon which Section 
78-30-4, supra, is intended to and does operate. 
In the first place the phrase "subject to the continuing 
jurisdiction of the Court" added nothing to the decree that 
was not already implicit in the decree by virtue of the 
statutes above set forth, which specifically provide that 
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court shall continue. The 
continuing jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court is precisely 
parellel with the continuing jurisdiction of the District 
Court in divorce matters as provided by Section 30-3-5 
U. C. A., supra, and in each case the parties can invoke the 
processes of either court to modify its decrees, regardless 
of whether the decree reserves that right or not. Conse-
quently, if appellant's argument were followed to its logical 
conclusions, there could be no decree in the Juvenile Court 
or in divorce proceedings in the District Court to which 
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Section 78-30-.t,., supra, could apply. A divorce decree, par-
ticularly as to custody of children, is always subject to 
modification upon a showing of changed circumstances, re-
gardless of whether one spouse is awarded the custody of 
children without any reservation of rights in the other 
spouse or not, and the same is true of a decree of the 
Juvenile Court, the statute in the latter case providing for 
the reopening of a decree the same as Section 30-3-5 U. C. A. 
supra, provides for the reopening of a divorce decree. 
We think the court in the case of Ronck v. Ranck, 
supra, aptly summed up the applicable rule involved as 
follows ( pp. 904-905) : 
"The statute recognizes that the consent of both 
parents, even though divorced, is necessary to an 
adoption, unless the divorce was granted upon the 
ground of cruelty of which the offending parent had 
been adjudged guilty. It follows that it is not the 
divorcement but the adjudication of cruelty that is 
made the basis of rendering the consent unneces-
sary. It is the unfitness of the one so adjudged 
guilty and the absence, by reason thereof, of that 
parental fitness necessary in determining the child's 
welfare that his or her consent is not required along 
with that of the unoffending parent. It does not 
follow, however, that the fact of unfitness so found 
is one that necessarily continues or that the court is 
precluded by such adjudication from inquiring there-
in further where it is in the interest of the child to 
do so." 
May we revert to Jackson v. Spellman, supra, and to 
that part of the opinion reading as follows : 
"More precisely, we are of the opinion that 
where a divorce is granted for cruelty and the in-
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nocent spouse is a warded the custody of the chil-
ren (as in this case), consent of the guilty spouse 
can only be dispensed with in a proceeding for adop-
tion of such children when the custody is awarded 
to the innocent party without reserving any rights 
whatever in the guilty spouse. The custody must 
be absolute" (emphasis supplied). 
In the light of this rule it is crystal clear that the de-
cree of the Juvenile Court reserved no rights whatever to 
custody of the children in the natural parents-they were 
completely and absolutely deprived of any custody what-
ever. We invite the Court's attention to the fact that the 
decree is in two parts, each complete in and of itself. In 
the first part the natural parents were completely and 
absolutely deprived of custody and if the words "subject 
to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court" have the signifi-
cance attached to them by appellant, we think it is of ut-
most significance that these words do not appear in that 
part of the decree depriving the parents of custody, but in 
the following provision committing the children to the 
Welfare Department . The decree is as complete and\ab-
solute with respect to the deprivation of custody and the 
reasons therefor as it is possible to make it. 
Further considering appellant's contentions regard-
ing the decree, let us paraphrase it and assume that, in-
stead of providing as it does, the decree provided as follows: 
"It is adjudged and decreed by the Court that Rhea Walker 
Deveraux, one of the parents of said children, be and she 
is hereby deprived of the cus~ody of said children. It is 
further ordered by the Court that said children be and they 
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are hereby declared and adjudged to be dependent, neglect-
ed children within the meaning of the laws of Utah, in such 
cases made and provided, and that subject to the continu-
ing jurisdiction of the Court~ the care, custody and control 
of said children be awarded to Ellis Deveraux, the father 
of said children." Surely, under such a decree if the cases 
cited by counsel and above considered have any application 
whatever to the situation herein (which admittedly they 
do), they squarely hold that under such circumstances it 
would be unnecessary to obtain the natural's mother's con-
sent to an adoption. Is there any real difference between 
the situation in the hypothetical case and in the instant 
cases? We submit there is not. 
We repeat that under the authorities above cited the 
decree of the Juvenile Court permanently deprived the 
natural parents of the custody of the children: Consequent-
ly, under the clear and certain language of Section 78-30-4 
U. C. A., supra, these children may be adopted without the 
consent of the natural parents. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DE-
CREED THESE ADOPTIONS WITHOUT THE 
CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER BY 
VIRTUE OF HER HAVING BEEN JUDICIAL-
LY DEPRIVED OF THEIR CUSTODY BY THE 
JUVENILE COURT. 
We have shown that the natural parents were judicially 
deprived of the custody of the children involved in these 
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adoptions and that within the clear and certain language of 
Sectiou 78-30-4 U. C. A. no consent was necessary from 
them in the adoption proceedings. 
The rule supporting this conclusion, and universally 
recognized, we believe without exception, is stated in 1 Am. 
J ur. p. 642, par. 41, as follows: 
"The right of a parent with respect to his child 
is not an absolute paramount proprietary right or 
interest in or to the custody of the infant, but is in 
the natur~ of a trust reposed in him, which imposes 
upon him the reciprocal obligation to maintain, care 
for, and protect the infant, and the law secures him 
in this right so long as he shall discharge the correl-
ative duties and obligations, and no longer. The 
state may provide for forfeiture of the parent's 
natural rights and for the adoption of a child, with-
out the consent of the parents, where, in accordance 
with such statutory provision, circumstances of mis-
conduct exist which so warrant. And where the 
custody of a child has been taken from the parents 
for delinquency by adversary proceedings, their con-
sent to its adoption is no longer necessary." Cf. 
Nugent v. Powell, (\Vyo.), 33 P. 23, 28. 
This principle has even been extended to dispense with 
the necessity for notice of hearing to the parents under such 
circumstances, and is aptly explained in 1 Am. Jur. pp. 645-
646, as follows : 
"The only exception to the general rule that the 
rights of the parent, however much 'he may be at 
fault, cannot be cut off without notice to him and an 
opportunity to be heard in his own behalf exists in 
the presence of statutes providing for the divesting 
of the parent's natural rights in an adversary pro-
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ceeding for that purpose, or of which it is an inci-
dent. Thus, it will be obs2rved that the exception 
is apparent rather than real, inasmuch as the par-
ent has, previous to the adoption proceeding, had 
his day in court and a full determination of his par-
ental rights, so that there is no longer need of their 
protection at the time of the adoption. Where the 
custody of a child has been taken from the parents 
for delinquency, by adversary proceedings, notice 
of adoption proceedings is unnecessary, since the 
parents have already been divested of the custody 
and control of the child." 
See annotation 24 A. L. R. 427. Cf. In re Smith's 
Estate, (Cal.) 195 P. (2d) 842, 848-849. 
Weste,rlund v. Croaff, supra, also cited in appellant's 
Brief, is to the same effect. In that case a writ of prohibi-
tion was granted on behalf of the father of a minor daugh-
ter, who had become divorced from the mother, prohibiting 
the superior court from proceeding in an adoption matter 
in which the mother and her husband were attempting to 
adopt the child under the claim that the father had wilfully 
deserted and neglected to provide for the child for one year 
prior to the filing of the petition. The father appeared in 
opposition to the petition, showed that he had not given his. 
consent to the adoption and denied that he had deserted or 
neglected his daughter. The lower court found that he had 
not deserted and neglected the child and thereupon attempt-
ed to proceed to determine the question of whether or not 
it would be for the welfare of the child and her best interests 
~hat the adoption should be made. In this proceeding the 
wurt apparently relied upon a provision of an old statute 
which provided that "an adoption may be decreed without 
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the consent of the parent, guardian, next of kin or ~ext 
friend where the interests of the child will be promoted 
thereby." The court found that this provision had been 
omitted in the revision of the law by the legislature, that 
there was no authority to grant an adoption on the basis 
of "best interests" alone, thus making it mandatory that 
the natural parent consent to the adoption unless the parent 
was insane, imprisoned or had been guilty of wilful deser-
tion or neglect. The court said ( p. 845) : 
"None of these statutory equivalents of consent 
is present in the instant case. There is no conten-
tion that the relator is insane or imprisoned, and 
the court expressly found that he was not guilty 
of wilful desertion or neglect to provide for the 
child." 
The rationale of this decision clearly is that if any of 
the statutory equivalents mentioned in the above quotation 
had been present, as is the case in the instant proceedings, 
the court could and would have decreed the adoption with-
out the consent of the father. 
In the instant cases the statutory equivalent of consent 
is the decree of the Juvenile Court depriving the natural 
parents of custody, on account of neglect. 
Appellant argues however, that if the court can, by 
any justification, hold that the consent of the natural 
mother was not necessary, the District Court still did not 
have jurisdiction to grant the adoption without obtaining 
the consent and approval of the Juvenile Court (Br. 28). 
If this be a question of lack of jurisdiction of . the District 
Court because of the Juvenile Court having exclusive jur· 
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isdiction, as argued under Point I A of appellant's brief, 
certainly the consent of the Juvenile Court wourd not con-
fer jurisdiction. If however, it is a question of the right 
to proceed and proof, it is immaterial under Section 78-30-J,. 
U. C. A. whether the consent of the Juvenile Court is ob-
tained or not. Section 55-10-30 (5) U. C. A., infra, permits 
the Juvenile Court in the cases of neglect to dispose of the 
child "in any other way, [with certain exceptions not ma-
terial] that may in the discretion and judgment of the 
court under all circumstances be for the best interest of 
the child * * * ." In view of these provisions the method 
provided by Sections 55-10-40 and 55-10-43 U. C. A. is not 
exclusive, but is merely one of the ways that adoptions may 
be effected. This method has no bearing whatsoever in,the 
instant proceedings and of course can have no effect upon 
the jurisdiction of the court below. 
POINT IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS REQUIRED TO 
CONSIDER AND MAKE FINDINGS AS TO 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN. 
As the heading of Point II of appellant's brief (p. 
29) it is stated that "the welfare of a child is not the para-
mount issue as to whether the court has jurisdiction or 
authority to permit an adoption." 
We have no quarrel with this statement but have dif-
ficulty understanding its place in appellant's brief. At no 
time have these appellees contended that in determining 
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the jurisdiction or authority of the court below to decree 
the adoptions the welfare of the children was the para-
mount issue or any issue. This Court however, has held, 
as quoted in appellant's brief (p. 33), in In re Adoption of 
D - - -, (Utah) 252 P. (2d) 223, that "nevertheless, when 
questions of child custody arise, the welfare of the child 
and her chances for a suitable home environment and ad-
vantages in nurture, training and education to the end that 
she may live and be conditioned for a well adjusted happy 
and useful life are important factors to consider. In fact, it 
is often stated that such considerations are of paramount im-
portance. However, this is modified by the presumption1 
that the welfare of the child will best be subserved by being 
in the custody of its natural parent." 
If, as is stated in appellant's brief (pp. 29-30) "the 
District Court in these matters clearly indicates by its find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law in each case that it was 
upon its finding that it would be to the best interests of 
the children that they be adopted * * * that it entered 
its decrees of adoption," this was precisely what it was re-
1 
"Presumptions," as said in Machowik v. Kansas City etc. R. 
Co., (Mo.) 94 S. W. 256, 262, "may be looked on as the bats of the 
law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual 
facts." In Peters v. Lohr, (S. D.) 124 N. W. 853, 855, this well-
recognized principle is aptly stated as follows: "the presumption, 
where the opposite party has produced prima facie evidence, has spent 
its force and served its purpose, and the party then, in whose fav~r 
the presumption operated must meet his opponent's prima facie 
evidence, and not presumptions." "A presumption is not evidence of a 
fact, but purely a conclusion." As we shall point out later in this 
brief the evidence is not only overwhelming but in fact uncontroverted, 
and the fact so found by the court below on such evidence, that the 
physical, emotional and moral health and stability of the said child-
ren, their security and best interests will best be promoted by the· 
adoptions and that the mental and physical health of the children 
would be endangered and it would be a psychological risk and detri-
mental to their physical, emotional, and moral health and stability 
to return them to the appellant. 
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quired to do. The court, however, did not find or conclude, 
as set forth in the omitted portion of this quotation above 
and as inferred by the entire statement, that it would be to 
the best interests of the children "that the natural mother 
be deprived of her own children." It was unnecessary to so 
find or conclude because this was already an accomplisped 
fact brought about by the decree of the Juvenile Court 
which under Jensen v. Sevy, supra, was binding on the 
District Court. 
We do contend, however, that under the provisions of 
Section 78-30-9 U. C. A., infra, the District Court was re-
quired to inquire into facts concerning the best interests 
of the children and, having found and concluded to its satis-
faction that the best interests of the children would be 
promoted thereby, it was mandatory that the court decree 
the adoptions. 
Appellant remarks that nowhere in the findings, 
conclusions or decree is it f)etermined that the natural 
mother was not a fit and proper person to have the care, 
custody and control of the children. Here again, it was un-
necessary for the court to make any finding in this regard 
because it had before it the decree of the Juvenile Court 
establishing that fact. Moreover, nowhere under the sta-
tutes relating to adoption is the District Court required to 
make such a finding. Its right to proceed without consent 
of the parents is premised upon t~e Juvenile Court having 
so found and having consequently deprived the natural par-
ents of custody. Try as she will, the appellant connot get 
around the decree of the Juvenile Court-that decree stands 
as to her fitness as well as to the deprivation of custody. 
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We have no quarrel with the decisions in Howes v. 
Cohen, (Cal.) 255 P. (2d) 761; In re Schwab's Adoption, 
(Pa.) 50 Atl. (2d) 504; In re adoption of D - - -, supra, 
cited and quoted from at length in appellant's brief (pp. 
80-85) or with the principles therein established. But these 
decisions, to the extent quoted, only reiterate the general 
rule, as stated by appellant, "that the natural parents have 
a paramount right to their children if they are fit and prop-
er persons to have such custody" (emphasis supplied). In 
the instant cases we have a competent and binding judicial 
determination by the Juvenile Court, that has never been set 
aside, that the natural mother is an unfit and improper per-
son to have the custody of said children, and furthermore 
what is more important under the statute, a judicial depri-
vation of custody, which as we have heretofore shown, is 
the statutory equivalent of consent. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE 
AND JUDGMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT 
DATED FEBRUARY 13, 1953, IN THE MAT-
TER OF LARRY AND BLAINE DEVERAUX. 
The decree of February 13, 1953, grew out of proceed-
ings relating to Larry and Blaine Deveraux and was in 
nowise related to the two children involved in the instant 
causes. Consequently, it could have no materiality or bind-
ing effect in these causes, and under no rule of law cited 
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by appellant or stretch of the imagination can the decree 
in those proceedings, in any respect, become res judicata 
and binding upon the District Court in the instant cases. 
While we might prolong this brief by endless citations, we 
believe it to be so elementary that the rule of res judicata 
cannot apply as between the decree in that proceeding and 
the instant proceedings, if for no other reason than that the 
parties are not the same, that no further citation is needed. 
Appellant states (Br. 36) that "the Juvenile Court is 
a court of competent jurisdiction in connection with the 
care, custody and control of the minor children and its 
findings and decree as to the fitness of their mother, unless 
appealed from, become res judicata and binding upon the . 
District Court." If the words "res judicata and" were 
eliminated from this statement and if the "findings and de-
cree" referred to were in relation to a proceeding involving 
the two children who are the subjects of these adoption pro-
ceedings and not to two other children, we would be inclined 
to agree with it. Furthermore, if such were the case the 
District Court could not have decreed the adoptions herein. 
But certainly no rule of law, at least none cited by appel-
lant, or with which we are familiar, would permit the inter-
position of a decree in a wholly different matter to effect 
or influence such a result. 
If this appellant had included the two children involved 
herein in her petition before the Juvenile Court for return 
of custody and had obtained from that court the decree 
which was entered but which would also have included 
Diane and Gene, then it would seem that the appellees would 
have no basis upon which to premise adoptions and the Dis-
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trict Court could not so decree2 • This would seem to be the 
crux of these proceedings and the statement of appellant 
above quoted would appear to be a tacit admission of the 
basic error of her position herein and the correctness of 
the appellees'. 
It is interesting to note that while counsel argues that 
the District Court erred in not admitting the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and decree entered in a case not 
relating to the two children involved in the instant proceed-
ings, be quite strenuously objected to the admission of any 
part of the files of the Juvenile Court relating to Diane 
and Gene other than the decree, and was sustained by the 
court (Tr. 36-37). Certainly if the findings and conclusions 
made in the very case involving the subject children were 
inadmissible, then a fortiori findings and conclusions enter-
ed in a case not involving the subject children would be 
clearly inadmissible. 
We submit that the District Court did not err in re-
fusing to admit the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment of the Juvenile Court in the proceedings involving 
only Larry and Blaine Deveraux. 
~-2-We point out, however, that the Juvenile Court only found that 
the appellant's present conduct "appears" to qualify her to"ass~me 
the custodv of those children and only returned them to her subJect 
to the continuing jurisdiction" of that court. 
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POINT VI. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REFUS-
ED TO ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE WRITTEN 
REPORT OF THE TOOELE COUNTY WEL-
FARE DEPARTMENT. 
Appe~lant complains of the refusal of the District 
Court to admit the written report of the Tooele County 
Department of Public Welfare on the ground that this evi-
dence was material to show that appellant had changed her 
way of life and was a fit and proper person to have custody 
of her children. 
We submit, however, that the court very properly re-
jected this exhibit. This is a report made by an individual 
to Judge Alder in connection with the proceedings to re-
store the custody of Larry and Blaine to their natural par-
ents-it does not purport to be the report of the State De-
partment of Public Welfare relating to the two children 
the subject of these adoptions, which report is required in 
adoption cases. Furthermore, no issue was, or could be, 
before the District Court as to whether appellant had 
changed her way of life and was a fit and proper person 
to have the custody of Diane and Gene, the two children in-
volved. The decree of the Juvenile Court to the contrary, 
insofar as it applies to Diane and Gene, was at that time 
in full force and effect and binding on the District Co~rt. 
Consequently, there could be no issue on this question be-
fore the District Court and no error in its refusal to admit 
an exhibit offered for such purpose. 
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As a matter of fact, if any error was made by the 
court in its refusal, it was harmless because the person 
who made the report was before the court as a witness (Tr. 
106-111) and testified substantially to the same effect as 
the report, and it must be assumed that the court took these 
matters into consideration and weighed them in neverthe-
less finding as a fact that the interests of the children will 
best be promoted by the adoptions. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Appellant complains that the court erred in entering 
its findings of fact "2", and particularly that portion "and 
permanently depriving the aforesaid natural parents of 
said child." 
We have heretofore pointed out under Point II that 
the decree of the Juvenile Court did permanently deprive 
the natural parents of the custody of the children within the 
clear and certain language of Section 78-30-4. U. C. A., 
supra, as well as its intent. Therefore, that finding was 
properly made by the court. 
Appellant also complains about findings "10" and "11" 
which are the same in both cases. She complains, not on 
the grounds that they are not supported by the evidence, 
but on the ground that such findings completely ignore 
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the presumptions that it will be to the best interests of a 
child to be with its natural parents if they are fit and 
proper persons. They take no issue with findings "6" and 
"7", which we shall set out in full and refer to later here-
in, and from which, as inescapable facts, findings "10" 
and· "11" naturally flow, aside from the fact that specific 
evidence thereon was received by the court from several 
witnesses, as pointed out in our statement of facts herein. 
We submit that these findings are abundantly sup-
ported by the record and are inescapable and that the con-
clusions of law "1", "2" and "3" complained of by appellant 
naturally and logically flow from such findings and are 
compelled thereby. 
We have also elsewhere in this brief demonstrated that 
it was not error on the part of the court to fail to make a 
finding as to the fitness of the natural mother to have 
custody of the children. This was not an issue before the 
court. 
3 The effect of this presumption has been elsewhere argued at 
length in this brief and must necessarily be considered to have been 
completely and thoroughly overcome by the evidence which resulted in 
the findings complained of. Suffice it to say that there is an abund-
ance of evidence in the record on the part of the appellees to support 
these findings and there is no evidence to the contrary on the part of 
the appellant that the children would be better off in her home--as 
pointed out by this court in In re Olson, supra - or in fact 
that she even loves them, or otherwise. She has not shown any 
reasons for uprooting the children from the environments and homes 
in which they now reside as a result of her cruel neglect and to which 
they have now become attached and in which they have the love, af-
fection and care of devoted parents-something neither of them ap-
parently ever had before coming to the appellees. 
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POINT VIII. 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN 
REQUIRE THEIR ADOPTIONS BY THE AP-
PELLEES. 
We have not heretofore considered the contentions of 
appellant with respect to the rule of strict construction of 
adoption statutes. We now point out however that, as 
.stated in 011srud v. Lehman, supra, quoted from by appel-
lant, "the tendency of the courts is away from the narrow 
and technical construction of adoption statutes appearing 
in some of the earlier cases." This tendency and its approval 
are considered and adopted by this Court, in the recent 
case of In re adoption of D - - -, a minor, supra, in which 
the Court stated as follows: 
"Nevertheless when questions of child custody 
arise, the welfare of the child and her chances for a 
suitable home environment and advantages in nur-
ture, training and education to the end that she may 
live and be conditioned for a well adjusted, happy and 
useful life are important factors to consider. In fact, 
it is often stated that such considerations are of the 
paramount importance. However, this is modified by 
the presumption that the welfare of the child will 
best be subserved by being in the custody of its 
natural parent. In the case of Walton v. Coffman, 
Mr. Justice Wade analyzes the antecedent cases of 
this court regarding contests over children and 
cogently sets forth this principle, but recognizes 
that the right of the natural parent may be surrend-
ered or lost. When a parent has failed to give the 
child the attention and love normally to be expected, 
has abandoned its care to others, and by irresponsi-
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ble conduct shown an unwillingness or inability to 
measure up to parental responsibilities, these mat-
ters may be taken into consideration by the court in 
connection with other factors in determining the 
right to custody. 
"Fourth : Public policy favors the adoption of 
children who are left without parental refuge. Once 
a child has been cast adrift and is without responsi-
ble parental care, the policy of the law should be to 
assist in every way in establishing a satisfactory 
parent-child and family relationship. Adoptive par-
ents should not be discouraged by a construction of 
the law which would cause them to fear the conse-
quences of accepting a child because of the knowl-
edge that the fate of their efforts would be at the 
will of the natural parent. As Mr. Justice Miller 
states: 
"'It is apparent that if in particular cases 
the unstable whims and fancies of natural moth-
ers were permitted, first to put in motion all 
the flow of parental love and expenditure of 
time, energy and money which is involved in 
adoption, and then, as casually, put the whole 
process in reverse, the major purpose of the 
statute would be largely defeated'." 
This court also in In re Olson, supra, in approving Ex 
parte Day, (Wash.) 65 P. (2d) 1049, held (p. 215) : "That 
in determining whether children should be taken from the 
home of friends of the highest character who were willing 
and able to care for them and placed in the custody of the 
father, the court would not take into consideration the 
relative degree of comfort or luxury which might surround 
them, but would consider 'Where the child would receive the 
greater degree of affection and discriminating care which 
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tt1ould tmd to best fit them to take their places in the active 
affairs of life" (emphasis supplied). 
The District Court made certain findings, which we 
have heretofore pointed out have not been challenged by the 
appellant and which are, in the case of Diane, as follows: 
"6. That because of her neglect by her natural 
parents, at the time the said child was placed with 
petitioners, she was very nervous run-down and 
sickly ; she was suffering from rickets, her legs be-
ing misshapen ; she had difficulty walking and 
would frequently step on her own toes; she had dull 
and stringy hair; she was undernourished and thin; 
she had a frightened look about her and seemed to 
have a pronounced feeling of insecurity and appear-
ed to be frightened of people and was in need of 
special care and attention. 
"7. That since entering petitioners' home she 
has been given special care and attention, and be-
cause of their love, devotion and special care of 
her, her general condition has become normal, al-
though she is still somewhat underweight; she is 
now well adjusted in her social relationships with 
children and adults and has confidence in and love 
and appreciation for other people. She has the love 
and devotion of the petitioners and of their families 
and reciprocates the same" (Tr. 18). 
And in the case of Gene, as follows: 
"6. That because of his neglect by his natural 
parents, at the time the said child was placed with 
petitioners he needed special care and attention; he 
was very nervous, suffered with enuresis, was in-
secure, rundown and sickly, his teeth were in bad con-
dition and he was poorly adjusted in his social rela-
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tionships with children and adults, used profanity 
frequently, displayed violent temper tantrums and 
exhibited cruel tendencies toward other children ; he 
seemed to be suspicious of everyone, showed no re-
spect for the rights or property of others and ex-
hibited no love or appreciation toward others. 
"7. That since entering petitioners' home he 
has been given special care and attention, and be-
cause of their love, devotion and special care of 
him, his general condition has become normal, he 
is now well adjusted in his social relationships with 
children and adults, he no longer uses profanity, dis-
plays violent temper tantrums or exhibits cruel 
tendencies toward other children and now has re-
spect for the rights and property of others and has 
confidence in and love, respect, and appreciation for 
other people. He has the love and devotion of the 
petitioners and their other children and recipro-
cates the same" (Tr. 16-17). 
Could any court, faced with these facts and in the 
absence of proof by the appellant that they would be better 
off with her, reasonably or in good conscience conclude 
otherwise than the best interests of the children require 
their adoption by the appellees? The children are each now 
properly adjusted in their present environment, subject to 
wholesome influences; they are happy and love, and are 
loved by, their adoptive parents and their families. They 
now neither recognize nor know their natural mother nor 
their two other brothers, and to tear them from their loved 
ones now would, as found by the court, be a psychological 
risk and detrimental to their physical, emotional and moral 
health and stability. 
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The final paragraph in the argument in appellant's 
brief poses some significant questions. We shall answer 
them in their converse order. 
We, too, cannot see why notice should be given the 
natural mother, in view of the deprivation of custody by 
the Juvenile Court. We have pointed out under Point III 
of this brief, with citations of authority, that notice is 
not necessary under the circumstances herein and quote 
from 1 Am. Jur. pp. 645-646 to that effect. Appellees first 
proceeded on that basis and secured orders of adoption and 
we believe the orders were valid but, after appellant filed 
habeas corpus proceedings and in order to obviate any 
question of validity of the orders and to eliminate a multi-
plicity of actions, the cases were reset upon notice to the 
appellant, the orders of adoption were vacated and trial 
had herein resulting in the decrees of adoption now under 
attack by appellant. 
Notice was not given or required so that the appellant 
might present to the court her fitness for the care, custody 
and control of the children. This could not be an issue so 
long as the decree of the Juvenile Court remained un-
changed. 
Notice of the adoption proceedings were not given to 
the natural mother purely for the purpose of protesting 
that the adopting parents were not proper or that it would 
not be for the best interests of the children to be adopted 
by them, although we feel that the court might hear her in 
these matters as well as it might hear any other person 
in these particulars to the end that the court would not 
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permit the adoptions against the best interests of the 
children and to improper persons. The notice to the natural 
mother, if required in such cases as these, is merely to give 
her an opportunity to show whether consent is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we respectfully submit that the decision 
and judgment of the District Court is correct and should 
be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. E. BLACKHAM, 
Attorney for Appellees 
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STATUTES INVOLVED 
The pertinent provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
are as follows: 
30-3-5. Disposition of property and children. 
-When a decree of divorce is made the court may 
make such orders in relation to the children, prop-
erty and parties, and the maintenance of the parties 
and children, as may be equitable; provided, that if 
any of the children have attained the ag~ of ten 
years and are of sound mind, such children shall 
have the privilege of selecting the parent to which 
they will attach themselves. Such subsequent changes 
or new orders may be made by the court with re-
spect to the disposal of the children or the distribu-
tion of property as shall be reasonable and proper. 
55-10-5. Jurisdiction of juvenile courts.-The 
juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdic-
tion in all cases relating to the neglect, dependency 
and delinquency of children who are under eighteen 
years of age, except in felony cases as hereinafter 
provided, and the custody, detention, guardianship of 
the person, trial and care of such neglected, depen-
dent and delinquent children, and the employment of 
children as provided by law; and shall also have 
jurisdiction over adult persons for all misdemeanors 
committed by them relating to the custody, abuse, 
detention, guardianship, employment, probation, 
neglect, dependency, delinquency and care of chil-
dren who are under eighteen years of age as is now 
or may be provided for by law. 
( 1) In any case in which the court shall find, 
a child neglected, dependent or delinquent it may, in 
the same or in any subsequent proceedings, upon the 
parents of such child being duly summoned or vol-
untarily appearing as hereinafter provided, proceed 
to inquire into the ability of such parents to support 
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the child or contribute thereto, or into the fitness of 
such parents to continue in the custody and control 
of such child. The court may enter such order or de-
cree as shall be according to law andjor equity in 
the premises, and may enforce the same in any way 
in which a court of law or equity may enforce its 
orders or decrees. 
* * * * * 
(3) When jurisdiction shall have been ac-
quired by the court in the case of any child, such 
child shall continue for the purposes of such case 
under the jurisdiction of the court until he becomes 
twenty-one years of age, unless discharged prior 
thereto or unless he is committed to the state in-
dustrial school or to the district court as hereinafter 
provided. 
( 4) Nothing herein contained shall deprive 
other courts of the right to determine the custody 
of children upon writs of habeas corpus, or when 
such custody is incidental to the determination of 
causes in such courts. Such other courts may, how-
ever, decline to pass upon questions of custody and 
may certify the same to the juvenile court for hear-
ing and determination or recommendation. 
* * * * * 
55-10-30. Judgment in cases of delinquency, 
dependency or neglect.-At the conclusion of any 
hearing the court may dismiss the case, or may 
render a decree and judgment that the child is de-
linquent, dependent, neglected or otherwise within 
the provisions of this chapter. If the juvenile is ad-
judged delinquent, dependent, neglected or otherwise 
within the provisions of this chapter, the court shall 
enter in writing the facts constituting such delin-
quency, dependency, neglect or other offense and 
may further adjudge and decree as follows: 
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( 1) That the child be placed on probation or 
under supervision in his own home, or in the custody 
of a relative or other fit person, upon such terms 
as the court shall determine ; 
(2) That the child be committed to the state 
industrial school or to any suitable institution, chil-
dren's aid society or other agency incorporated under 
the laws of this state and authorized to care for 
children or to place them in family homes, or to any 
such institution or agency provided by the state or 
a county; 
( 3) That the child be required to make resti-
tution for damage or loss caused by his wrongful 
acts; 
( 4) That the child be placed under such guar-
dianship or custody as may be warranted by the 
evidence and for the best interest of the child; pro-
vided, however, that in the selection of a guardian 
the court shall give due consideration to the prefer-
ence of parents ; 
(5) That the child be disposed of in any other 
way, except to commit it to jail or prison, that may, 
in the discretion and judgment of the court, under 
all circumstaces be for the best interest of the child, 
to the end that its wayward tendencies shall be cor-
rected and the child be saved to useful citizenship. 
55-10-31. Modification during minority.-In· 
operative after majority.-No judgment or decree 
of the juvenile court shall operate after the child 
becomes twenty-one years of age and all orders, 
judgments and decrees, except commitments to the 
district court or to the state industrial school, may 
be modified or revoked by the court at any time 
.before the child becomes twenty-one years of age. 
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78-30-4. Consent to adoption.-A legitimate 
child cannot be adopted without the consent of its 
parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child without 
the consent of its mother, if living, except that con-
sent is not necessary from a father or mother who 
has been judicially deprived of the custody of the 
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; pro-
vided, that the district court may order the adoption 
of any child, without notice to or consent in court 
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall 
appear that the parent or parents whose consent 
would otherwise be required have theretofore, in 
writing, acknowledged before any officer author-
ized to take acknowledgments, released his or her or 
their control or custody of such child to any agency 
licensed to receive children for placement or adop-
tion under chapter 8 of Title 55, and such agency 
consents, in writing, to such adoption. 
78-30-7. Jurisdiction of district court.-Adop-
tion proceedings shall be commenced by filing in 
duplicate a petition with the clerk of the district 
court of the county where the person adopting re-
sides, and the petition to adopt and all orders, de-
crees, agreements and notices in the proceedings 
shall be filed in the office of the clerk of such court. 
78-30-8. Procedure-Agreement of adopting 
parents.-The person adopting a child and the child 
adopted, and the other persons whose consent is nec-
essary, must appear before the district court of the 
county where the person adopting resides, and the 
necessary consent must thereupon be signed and an 
agreement be executed by the person adopting to 
the effect that the child shall be adopted and treated 
in all respects as his own lawful child. 
78-30-9. Order of adoption.-The court must 
examine all persons appearing before it pursuant to 
the preceding provisions, each separately, and, if 
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satisfied that the interests of the child will be pro-
moted by the adoption, it must make an order d~ 
claring that the child shall thenceforth be regarded 
and treated in all respects as the child of the person 
adopting. 
78-30-14. Department of public welfare-
Served with petition-Duties-Report.-Upon the 
filing of a petition for the adoption of a minor child, 
if there is not filed therewith the written consent of 
a licensed child-placing agency for such adoption, a 
copy of such petition together with a statement con-
taining the full names and permanent address of 
the child and the petitioners shall be served by the 
court receiving the petition within five days, on the 
state department of public welfare of Utah, by reg. 
istered mail, with return receipt requested, or per-
sonal service. It shall be the duty of the state de-
partment of public welfare, through its own field 
agents, or through such other agencies and institu-
tions licensed by the department for the care and 
placement of children, or the probation officer of 
the juvenile court or court of like jurisdiction of the 
county, under the department's supervision, to ver-
ify the allegations of the petition, to make a thor-
ough investigation of the matter and to report its 
fin9ings in writing to the ·court within sixty days 
from service thereof. The report shall show among 
other things : 
(1) Why the natural parents, if living, desire 
to be relieved of the care, support, and guardianship 
of such child : 
(2) Whether the natural parents have aban-
doned such child or are morally unfit to have its 
custody: 
(3) Whether the proposed foster parent, or 
parents, is or are financially able and morally fit to 
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have the care, supervision, and training of such 
child: 
( 4) The physical and also the mental condi-
tion of such child insofar as this can be determined, 
and any other facts and circumstances deemed ad-
visable and necessary by said department to be in-
vestigated concerning said child and its welfare. 
Upon the day so appointed the court shall proceed 
to full hearing of the petition and the examination 
of the parties in interest, under oath, with the right 
of adjourning the hearing and examination from 
time to time as the nature of the case may require. 
If the report of the state department of public wel-
fare, or its duly authorized agents, as provided here-
in, disapprove of the adoption of the child, the court 
may dismiss the petition. No petition for adoption 
shall be granted until the child shall have lived for 
one year in the home of the adopting parents. 
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